This is an appeal by the Governor, the Director of the Department of Personnel Administration (DPA), and dozens of state government entities (collectively, the Governor) from a judgment of the Alameda Superior Court issuing a writ of mandate as petitioned by Local 1000 of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) on behalf of approximately 95,000 members employed by the State of California. The gist of the judgment was that the Governor's 2008 and 2009 Executive Orders instituting three mandatory monthly furlough days for state employees were declared
The appeal was fully briefed when our Supreme Court decided Professional Engineers in California Government v. Schwarzenegger (2010) 50 Cal.4th 989 [116 Cal.Rptr.3d 480, 239 P.3d 1186] (Professional Engineers), dealing with the legality of the Governor's 2008 Executive Order directing a mandatory two-day-a-month unpaid furlough. The court summarized its core holding as follows: "In mid-February 2009—shortly after the furlough program went into effect—the Legislature enacted, and the Governor signed, legislation that revised the Budget Act of 2008 (2008 Budget Act) by, among other means, reducing the appropriations for employee compensation contained in the original 2008 Budget Act by an amount that reflected the savings the Governor sought to obtain through the two-day-a-month furlough program. The February 2009 legislation further provided that the specified reduction in the appropriations for employee compensation could be achieved either through the collective bargaining process or through `existing administration authority.' That phrase, in the context in which the revised budget act was adopted and in light of the provision's legislative history, reasonably included the furlough program that was then in existence and that had been authorized by the current gubernatorial administration.... Under these circumstances, we conclude that the Legislature's 2009 enactment of the revisions to the 2008 Budget Act operated to ratify the use of the two-day-a-month furlough program as a permissible means of achieving the reduction of state employee compensation mandated by the act." (Professional Engineers, supra, 50 Cal.4th 989, 1000.)
By the time Professional Engineers was filed, the Legislature had, after the Governor had issued the second Executive Order, revised the 2009 budget act (2009 Budget Act) using language virtually identical to that it used in revising the 2008 Budget Act. The relevant language of both revised budget acts specifies that "each item of appropriation in this act ... shall be reduced ... to reflect a reduction in employee compensation achieved through ... existing administration authority ...." The Governor reads Professional Engineers's construction of the "existing administration authority" language as a blanket legislative validation of the furlough program then in place, be it two or three days per month, with no exceptions. We conclude that this simplistic interpretation is not what the Supreme Court intended.
That said, we conclude that Professional Engineers is virtually dispositive. The scope of the furlough program that the Legislature was ratifying was
Our independent research—confirmed by the parties at reargument— discloses that all but five of the state agencies and departments made defendants by SEIU are the subject of an "item of appropriation" in both the 2008 and the 2009 Budget Acts. The three-day-per-month furlough program is therefore valid as to these defendants. Because their inclusion was proper, their employees have no grievance, and no entitlement to backpay. Thus, as to 58 of the 63 defendants, the judgment must be reversed. As to the five remaining entities that have already implemented the full furlough program but are not named in an "item of appropriation," their inclusion cannot be deemed "mandated by the act" of the Legislature. However, given the virtual irrelevance of the record on appeal to the issues made dispositive in the wake of Professional Engineers, we remand in order that the parties may have the opportunity to present evidence as to whether the sources of funding for these entities are otherwise part of the budgetary process and therefore may be within the ambit of Professional Engineers.
The financial woes of the state that generated the Governor's Executive Orders and the ensuing litigation—including this case—are too well known to require detailed reiteration. The history of the situation up to the issuance of the second Executive Order in 2009 is also set out in Professional Engineers, supra, 50 Cal.4th 989, 1001-1008. Only the salient highlights will be noted here.
On December 19, 2008, the Governor issued Executive Order No. S-16-08. Citing "an approximately $15 billion General Fund deficit for the 2008-09 fiscal year, which without effective action, is estimated to grow to a $42 billion General Fund budget shortfall over the next 18 months," he directed that "effective February 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010, the Department of Personnel Administration shall adopt a plan to implement a furlough ... for two days per month, regardless of funding source" for "represented state employees," managers, and supervisors. Then, on July 1, 2009, because "California's revenues ... continue to plummet," the Governor issued Executive Order No. S-13-09 which ordered the furlough program expanded
In June 2009, SEIU, alleging that it represented approximately 95,000 state employees in nine bargaining units, brought suit alleging that the Executive Orders were "arbitrary, capricious and without a rational basis because they apply to employees whose salaries are paid by sources other than the General Fund, such as federal funds or special funds. In other words, the furloughing of employees in positions paid from sources other than the General Fund does not achieve the stated purpose of the Orders."
On December 31, 2009, the trial court issued its "Order Granting Petition For Writ of Mandate." The court's decision rested on two grounds. The first ground for finding the furlough program—and the Governor's Executive Orders—invalid was that the Governor "violated a mandatory duty" imposed by Government Code section 19851, subdivision (a), "to take into account the Agencies' `varying needs' before reducing working hours."
The second ground for the court's decision was that "furloughing employees to increase potential borrowing from special fund agencies interferes with those agencies' operations," and thereby violated section 16310, subdivision (a), and again qualified as an abuse of discretion "by ordering and implementing furloughs in order to increase internal borrowing from special funds, without regard to whether such borrowing interfered with the objects for which the special funds were created."
Also on February 25, 2010, the court filed its judgment directing issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate commanding (1) the Governor and the Director "to set aside the portions of the Governor's Executive Orders Nos. S-16-08 and S-13-09 calling for a furlough and resulting salary reduction for all employees of Respondent Departments and Agencies, and to cease and desist the furlough of such employees" and (2) the Controller "to immediately pay all employees of Respondent Departments and Agencies their full salary without any reductions pursuant to the illegal furloughs directed by the unlawful Executive Orders, and to take any and all actions required by law to restore any salary wrongfully withheld as a consequence thereof." The following day the Governor perfected this timely appeal from the judgment.
In the wake of Professional Engineers, the parties filed supplemental briefs addressing that decision and its impact upon the arguments advanced in the briefs already on file.
The ultimate fulcrum for the Supreme Court in Professional Engineers was this language in a provision of the legislation revising the 2008 Budget Act:
"Section 36 of Senate Bill 3X 2 provides in full:
"`Section 3.90 is added to the Budget Act of 2008, to read:
"`Sec. 3.90. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, each item of appropriation in this act, with the exception of those items for the California State University, the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, the Legislature (including the Legislative Counsel Bureau), and the judicial branch, shall be reduced, as appropriate, to reflect a reduction in employee compensation achieved through the collective bargaining process for represented employees or through existing administration authority and a proportionate reduction for nonrepresented employees (utilizing existing authority of the administration to adjust compensation for nonrepresented employees) in the total amounts of $385,762,000 from General Fund items and $285,196,000 from items relating to the other funds. It is the intent of the Legislature that General Fund savings of $1,024,326,000 and other fund savings of $688,375,000 in the 2009-10 fiscal year shall be achieved in the same manner described above. The Director of Finance shall allocate the necessary reduction to each item of appropriation to accomplish the employee compensation reductions required by this section.
"`(b) The Department of Personnel Administration shall transmit proposed memoranda of understanding to the Legislature promptly and shall include with each such transmission estimated savings pursuant to this section of each agreement.
"`(c) Nothing in this section shall change or supersede the provisions of the Ralph C. Dills Act (Chapter 10.3 (commencing with Section 3512) of Division 4 of Title 1 of the Government Code).'" (Professional Engineers, supra, 50 Cal.4th 989, 1044.)
The Supreme Court identified three reasons why the phrase "existing administration authority" should be treated as referring to the existing two-day-per-month furlough program:
"First, the legislative history of the provision in question clearly and explicitly establishes that the reductions in appropriations for employee compensation that were included in the bill reflected the two-day-a-month furloughs. ... This history makes it abundantly clear the Legislature
"Second, aside from the furlough plan, the only other available `existing administration authority' through which the state could have achieved the very substantial reduction in the appropriations for employee compensation mandated by the February 2009 budget legislation was the authority provided by section 19997, permitting a state appointing authority to `lay off' state employees `[w]henever it is necessary because of lack of ... funds, or whenever it is advisable in the interests of economy, to reduce the staff of any state agency ....' In our view it is not reasonable to suggest that the Legislature intended to compel the state, in the absence of a mutually agreed-upon collective bargaining resolution, to resort to layoffs of a significant percentage of state employees rather than to permit the state to utilize the furlough plan that was then already in use, particularly when the legislative history makes no reference to such layoffs.
"Third, although at the time the revised budget act was adopted on February 20, 2009, the trial court's judgment upholding the validity of the furlough program already had been appealed and the Legislature could not have known how the appeal ultimately would be resolved, it is reasonable to assume that body recognized that the reduction in employee compensation mandated by the revised 2008 Budget Act would have to be implemented prior to a final resolution of the appeal. We conclude that, in view of the exigent circumstances facing the Legislature, it intended to permit the then existing furlough program to be used as an alternative to other means that might be agreed upon through the collective bargaining process, without regard to whether the appellate courts ultimately determined that the Governor or the DPA possessed the authority to impose an unpaid furlough program unilaterally.
"Accordingly, we conclude that the phrase `existing administration authority'—as used in section 36 of Senate Bill 3X 2—was intended to encompass the then existing furlough program. By enacting this provision, the Legislature, through the exercise of its own legislative prerogative, authorized the substantial reduction in the appropriations for employee compensation, mandated in the revised budget legislation, to be achieved through the two-day-a-month furlough plan." (Professional Engineers, supra, 50 Cal.4th 989, 1046-1048.)
On July 23, 2009, 22 days after Governor Schwarzenegger issued Executive Order No. S-13-09 expanding the furlough program to three days per month, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 4X 1 (2009-2010 1st Ex.
"SEC. 552. Section 3.90 of the Budget Act of 2009 is amended to read:
"Sec. 390. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, each item of appropriation in this act, with the exception of those items for the California State University, the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, the Bureau of State Audits, the Legislature (including the Legislative Counsel Bureau), and the judicial branch, shall be reduced, as appropriate, to reflect a reduction in employee compensation achieved through the collective bargaining process for represented employees or through existing administration authority and a proportionate reduction for nonrepresented employees (utilizing existing authority of the administration to adjust compensation for nonrepresented employees) in the total amounts of $1,477,917,000 from General Fund items and $973,058,000 from items relating to other funds. The Director of Finance shall allocate the necessary reductions to each item of appropriation to accomplish the employee compensation reductions required by this section.
"(b) The Department of Personnel Administration shall transmit proposed memoranda of understanding to the Legislature promptly and shall include with each such transmission estimated savings pursuant to this section of each agreement.
"(c) Nothing in this section shall change or supersede the provisions of the Ralph C. Dills Act (Chapter 10.3 (commencing with Section 3512) of Division 4 of Title 1 of the Government Code)." (Stats. 2009, 4th Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 1, § 552.)
The Professional Engineers court explained that by enacting revisions to the 2008 Budget Act, the Legislature exercised its ultimate authority over compensation of state employees: "[W]hen the Legislature enacted, and the Governor then signed, legislation revising the 2008 Budget Act, the validity of the mandatory furlough program fundamentally changed. The new legislation explicitly reduced the 2008-2009 fiscal year appropriation for state employee compensation to a level reflecting the reduced compensation to be paid to employees under the Governor's furlough plan." (Professional Engineers, supra, 50 Cal.4th 989, 1043.)
Professional Engineers considered only the two furlough days implemented by reason of Executive Order No. S-16-08 and validated by the Legislature's subsequent ratification as evidenced by language in the revised 2008 Budget Act. The validity of the third furlough day mandated by Executive Order No. S-13-09 was not addressed. (Professional Engineers, supra, 50 Cal.4th 989, 1003, 1007.) But the Legislature's subsequent revision of the 2009 Budget Act used virtually identical language, and, by parity of reasoning, should thus be viewed as the Legislature's ratification of the third furlough day mandated by Executive Order No. S-13-09.
Neither the Governor nor SEIU appears to seriously contest that the validity of the three-day-per-month furlough program is established by the revised 2009 Budget Act, viewed through the lens of Professional Engineers; indeed, SEIU does not even mention the revised 2009 Budget Act in its supplemental brief. Beyond this generality, however, the parties have fiercely opposed views of the permissible scope of the program.
As previously indicated, the Governor submits that "Professional Engineers fully disposes of the issues in this case," intimating our only function is tantamount to a ministerial duty to reverse the trial court's judgment. Hoping to keep all of the named agencies within the furlough program, the Governor points to the language in both Executive Orders that the furlough program be applied to all state agencies "regardless of funding source." The court in Professional Engineers repeatedly referred to the ambit and operation of the program as "across the board" in reducing wages and salaries (Professional Engineers, supra, 50 Cal.4th 989, 1025, 1030, 1035, 1037), and spoke of the Legislature's revision of the 2008 Budget Act in connection with "the furlough program that was then in existence." (50 Cal.4th at pp. 1000, 1047; see also, id., at pp. 1046, 1047 ["then existing furlough plan"].) Thus, the Governor sees Professional Engineers as the Supreme Court's upholding legislative approval for the entirety of the expanded furlough program, leaving no room for distinctions based on funding sources.
SEIU accepts that Professional Engineers covers state employees who are paid out of the General Fund for two days of furlough pursuant to the Governor's first Executive Order. But SEIU insists that the authority of Professional Engineers ends there, and cannot reach three groups of state employees: (1) those who work for agencies or departments that are not funded by "an item of appropriation" in the Budget Act, which would mean agencies or departments that are financed from other sources, primarily dedicated or "special funds"; (2) those in agencies using special funds that are statutorily protected from having resources borrowed by the General Fund, the so-called "non-borrowable" funds; and (3) those in units of state government that are financed entirely by the federal government. As SEIU observes, there is no mention in Professional Engineers of "special" funds, "borrowable" funds, or federal funds that pay for operations of state government.
It is true that the court in Professional Engineers repeatedly used the language quoted by the Governor. But the Governor's view that the Legislature and the Supreme Court have made a blanket endorsement of the furlough program as implemented is contrary to the plain words of the revisions to both budget acts.
In his opening brief, the Governor represented that of the more than 60 state defendants, only 30 "receive a portion of their budgets from the General Fund." Given the importance of the issues, we followed President Reagan's famous maxim to "Trust, but verify," and examined the budget acts themselves. They establish that of the 63 named defendants, all but five have at least one "item of appropriation" in each of the budget acts. For the readers who also prefer to "Trust, but verify," the particulars are set out as an appendix to this opinion.
SEIU was expressly asked at oral argument whether, if a state agency is the subject of an item of appropriation in the 2008 and 2009 Budget Acts, that
Thus, under Professional Engineers, the existence of one or more items of appropriation for any of the named defendant agencies is conclusive. Despite much argument, SEIU is unable to identify a single statutorily designated "non-borrowable" specific fund (see fn. 8, ante) from which the Legislature purported to transfer amounts in order to balance either of the budgets.
As previously mentioned, our independent research disclosed that 58 of the 63 defendant state entities named in SEIU's amended petition are the subject of at least one item of appropriation in the 2008 and the 2009 Budget Acts. Therefore, as to those entities the Legislature has mandated and ratified the inclusion of their employees in the furlough program. It follows that the judgment against them must be reversed.
The five agencies named by SEIU in its amended petition that are not the subject of an item of appropriation in either of the budget acts are (1) the California Children and Families Commission (also known as First 5 California, the designation used by SEIU in its complaint); (2) the Prison Industry Authority; (3) the California Earthquake Authority; (4) the California Housing Finance Agency; and (5) the Office of Administrative Hearings. SEIU argues that these agencies are exempt from the furlough program because they do not rely on appropriations from the General Fund for their operation. More precisely, because these agencies receive no money from the General Fund, SEIU treats them as funded exclusively by special funds, and therefore per se outside the permissible scope of the furlough program.
These five agencies are not your standard bureaucracies. Their purposes, structures, and origin of operating moneys are so dissimilar as to preclude a group classification.
For example, there is the distinct situation of the continuing appropriation, which, as previously mentioned, may or may not appear in the Budget Act.
These are merely some of the possibilities dealing with matters that were never addressed in the trial court and thus cannot be verified from the record on appeal. We have already conceded that knowledge of the state budget process is not an ordinary judicial qualification. Because these are matters that cannot be resolved solely by reading the budget acts, we conclude it is appropriate to provide the parties with an opportunity to introduce evidence more directly pertinent to the issues as reframed by Professional Engineers. This can be done on the remand we order.
The Governor makes a compelling case that the state's budgetary problems were so deep and dire that innovative and comprehensive measures were
As an abstract matter, there may be much to commend the Governor's conception of a furlough program with the widest application consistent with public safety. On the other hand, there might be some force to SEIU's claim that it is economically pointless to try to reduce a massive budgetary shortfall by cutting back on the operations of agencies—for example, it claims, the Franchise Tax Board—that generate more revenues than their costs. These are weighty considerations, but it is not our job to resolve them.
No constitutional issue is presented against the legality of the furlough program. SEIU spends a good deal of its attention to the asserted illogic of a furlough program that may not result in saving money and may actually cost the state more than it saves. That may be true. But the furlough program can
Giving the program the broadest scope consistent with public safety may implicate considerations more intangible but no less consequential. It is clearly in the interests of harmonious operations that a spirit of shared sacrifice be widespread, avoiding invidious comparisons of paychecks between employees who work together or perform equivalent functions. In addition, given what appears to be the fact that certain agencies have multiple sources of funding, it might be administratively difficult for the Controller to determine which employees are subject to the furlough program.
The dollars and cents consequences—if such there be—are not established by the record on appeal. Savings effected by the furlough program might not necessarily be confined simply to reductions in employee salaries, as SEIU posits. Furloughing all employees might allow a building to be closed, thereby saving money not spent for lighting, heating, security, etc. In addition, on the assumption that the staff of the five agencies qualify as public employees, there may be pension-related costs of which we are unaware. There may be additional factors. We just do not know.
The foregoing establishes that neither of the two specified grounds for the judgment is sound. The first, based on the trial court's interpretation of section 19851, was rejected in Professional Engineers. (See fn. 2, ante.) The second, based on section 16310, is ineffective because it assumes a causal connection between borrowings from special funds and the furlough program that is no longer tenable after Professional Engineers.
The preceding analysis is based on matters and arguments that became relevant only after the trial court had entered its judgment. The filing of Professional Engineers shifted attention from the Government Code to the budget acts. A whole new nomenclature was introduced. And, although applying Professional Engineers we have been able to determine, as a matter of law, that almost all of the state agencies named as parties by SEIU are properly included in the expanded furlough program, there may be issues that cannot be answered by this court's independent research. We are sensitive to what Justice Holmes said more than a century ago: "Considerable latitude must be allowed for . . . possible peculiar conditions which this court can know but imperfectly, if at all." (Otis v. Parker (1903) 187 U.S. 606, 608-609 [47 L.Ed. 323, 23 S.Ct. 168].) We therefore deem it appropriate to provide counsel and the trial court an opportunity to explore whether any of the five remaining agencies were properly included within the three-day-per-month furlough program.
The purported appeals from the order overruling the demurrer and the two orders after hearing are dismissed. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to (1) recall the writ of mandate, (2) set aside the judgment granting the petition, and (3) conduct further
Kline, P. J., and Lambden, J., concurred.
The following are the officers and agencies named in SEIU's amended complaint. Beside each officer and agency are details of relevant items of appropriation in the 2008 and 2009 Budget Acts. We have elected not to mention every item of appropriation for a given officer or agency.
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An individual state employee joined SEIU in her capacity as a taxpayer. In the interests of simplifying matters, this person will be subsumed in subsequent references to SEIU.
SEIU's original petition named 69 defendants, but this was reduced to 64 in the first amended petition. The 64 became 63 when one defendant was dismissed due to defective service. Apart from the Governor and Director of DPA, in its amended petition SEIU named as defendants the Controller, the Attorney General, and the Insurance Commissioner, although none of these constitutional officers played an active role in the litigation beyond filing an answer advising the court that they "take no position regarding the validity of the ... actions" challenged by SEIU. Also named as defendants, in addition to the Director of DPA, were the heads of 58 other state agencies, authorities, boards, commissions, departments, and other entities, including the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CALPERS) and the California State Teachers' Retirement System (CALSTRS). Up to the time they filed a separate notice of appeal, these individuals had separate counsel, made their own filings, and, with two exceptions, stood beside the Governor throughout the proceedings in the trial court. Since this appeal got under way, all their briefs have been filed "jointly." The two exceptions were CALPERS and CALSTRS, which aligned with SEIU in arguing that the Governor lacked the unilateral power to furlough employees of these independent agencies.
The trial court's analysis of this statute, and whether it could support the judgment, featured prominently in the parties' original briefs. The controversy became moot after the Supreme Court examined the statute and concluded that "just as section 19851, subdivision (a) cannot properly be interpreted as authorizing the Governor to impose the furlough here at issue, the provision also cannot properly be interpreted as prohibiting the Governor from imposing such a furlough. The statute simply does not address the furlough situation." (Professional Engineers, supra, 50 Cal.4th 989, 1029.) Thus, the issue of whether the trial court was right or wrong in its construction of section 19851, subdivision (a), is immaterial in light of the Supreme Court's conclusion that what truly mattered was the Legislature's passage of the revised 2008 Budget Act. In response to questioning by this court, the parties conceded as much.
Effective February 20, 2009, the following provisions were added: "(c) Except as described in subdivision (d), all moneys in the State Treasury may be loaned for the purposes described in subdivision (a), [¶] (d) Subdivision (c) shall not apply to any of the following: [¶] (1) The Local Agency Investment Fund. [¶] (2) Funds classified in the State of California Uniform Codes Manual as bond funds or retirement funds. [¶] (3) All or part of the moneys not needed in other funds or accounts for purposes of subdivision (a) where the Controller is prohibited by the California Constitution, bond indenture, or statutory or case law from transferring all or any part of those moneys." (Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 9, § 6.)
Although this provision was not considered in Professional Engineers, it is no more relevant than section 19581. Section 16310 deals with the transfers of funds, not the conditions of state employment. Thus, like section 19581, section 16310 "simply does not address the furlough situation." (Professional Engineers, supra, 50 Cal.4th 989, 1029.)
"For budgetary ... purposes, the funds of the state are divided into two main groups,
"The
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"Whenever cash in the General Fund is or will be exhausted, it is common practice for the State to borrow from internal state funds (borrowable resources) and from the external financial markets to fully meet its constitutional and statutory fiscal obligations....
"According to the [State Controller's] latest information, there are over 700 funds/accounts that are internal borrowable resources for the General Fund. These funds/accounts deposit their idle cash in the PMIA and the cash in the overall PMIA is invested by the State Treasurer's Office .... [The State Controller] evaluates the General Fund cash needs and determines how much to borrow from the borrowable resources that reside in the PMIA. With certain exceptions, this borrowing is actually made from the PMIA overall cash balance and not from individual funds/accounts."
But even this list is incomplete. It does not take account of the peculiar feature known as the continuing appropriation, that is, an appropriation that "`runs from year to year without the need for further authorization in the budget act.'" (White v. Davis, supra, 30 Cal.4th 528, 538, italics omitted.) Because a continuing appropriation is essentially "a self-executing authorization to disburse funds" for a specific purpose independent of the Budget Act (White v. Davis (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 197, 210, 223 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 691]; see Daugherty v. Riley (1934) 1 Cal.2d 298, 308 [34 P.2d 1005]; 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 809, 810-813 (1981)), it may not necessarily generate an "item of appropriation." (See Stats. 2008, ch. 268, § 3:00; Stats. 1983, ch. 323, § 151.4, p. 1099.)
In other words, a continuing appropriation is part of the budgetary process even if it goes unmentioned in the Budget Act. "Continuous appropriation status in no way removes the revenue or expenditures ... from annual adjustment in the Budget Act." (Stats. 1983, ch. 323, § 151.4, p. 1100.) Even more confusingly, continuing appropriations are often attached to what appear to be special funds. (E.g., § 75600 [establishing "a trust fund known as the Judges' Retirement System II Fund"]; Sts. & Hy. Code, § 188.62 ["there is hereby continuously appropriated to the [Department of Transportation] for expenditure all amounts paid to the department by the Bay Area Toll Authority"].) Some continuing appropriations go through the General Fund. (E.g., Ed. Code, § 22955, subd. (a) ["a continuous appropriation is hereby annually made from the General Fund ... for transfer to the Teachers' Retirement Fund"]; Pub. Resources Code, § 14312 ["The Collins-Dugan California Conservation Corps Reimbursement Account is hereby created in the General Fund" and "money in the ... Account is hereby continuously appropriated to the corps"].) Others seemingly do not. (E.g., Food & Agr. Code, § 62571 ["any money which is collected" by the Director of the Dept. of Food and Agriculture for the Milk Producers Security Trust Fund "is hereby continuously appropriated to the director"].) The monies going to the General Fund would appear to qualify as what the Department of Finance official identified as "General Fund Special Accounts."
The Prison Industry Authority is a part of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and is "authorized and empowered to operate industrial, agricultural, and service enterprises which will provide products and services needed by the state ... for any ... public use." (Pen. Code, §§ 2800, 2807, subd. (a).) A permanent Prison Industries Revolving Fund of not less than $730,000 exists "to meet the expenses necessary in the purchasing of materials and equipment, salaries, construction and cost of administration of the prison industries program." (Id., § 2806.)
The California Earthquake Authority is essentially a state-sponsored insurance pool of residential property insurers that issues policies of earthquake insurance to California residential property owners. (Ins. Code, § 10089.26.) It is authorized to purchase reinsurance and to issue bonds. (Id., §§ 10089.9, 10089.29.) The authority's "costs . . . operating and other expenses" are to be paid out of the California Earthquake Authority Fund, which is itself funded by a continuing appropriation. (Id., § 10089.22, subd. (b).)
The California Housing Finance Agency is located in the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency (Health & Saf. Code, § 50900), and is intended to "meet the housing needs of persons and families of low or moderate income" by facilitating the growth of housing stock. (Id., §§ 50950, 50959, 50961.) As summarized by our Supreme Court: "In furtherance of this purpose, the Agency is authorized to issue revenue bonds. . . . Proceeds of the bonds are to be made available to `housing sponsors' (described . . . as various types of private developers and local public entities) in the form of development loans, construction loans, mortgage loans (for new construction and rehabilitation) and advances in anticipation of such loans, to construct, develop and acquire housing developments [citations]. In addition, bond proceeds . . . may be used either to purchase loans from qualified mortgage lenders [citations] or to lend funds to qualified mortgage lenders on the condition that they make such loans [citations]." (California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 580 [131 Cal.Rptr. 361, 551 P.2d 1193].) The California Housing Finance Agency is meant to be fiscally self-sufficient. (Health & Saf. Code, § 50956.) The agency administers the Home Purchase Assistance Fund, which is funded by a continuing appropriation. (See id., § 51344.)
The Office of Administrative Hearings is in the Department of General Services. (§ 11370.2.) It provides the administrative law judges who preside over the numerous kinds of hearings governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (§ 11370 et seq.), or as otherwise required. (§ 11370.3.) It apparently has no annual budget and is hardly the master of its own financial affairs. Operating costs, including overhead, are billed and collected on a piecemeal basis: "The total cost to the state of maintaining and operating the Office of Administrative Hearings shall be determined by, and collected by the Department of General Services in advance or upon such other basis as it may determine from the state or other public agencies for which services are provided by the office." (§ 11370.4.)